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Abstract: This Guest Editor’s note reflects on the contributions of each article in the 
Special Issue on family firms’ behavior and performance. Building on this, several  
under-researched areas concerning family involvement in businesses are identified and the 
resulting impact on firm behavior and performance is explained. Finally, future research 
directions and insights for practitioners are outlined. 
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1. Introduction 
I am pleased to announce the first Special Issue on Family Firms in the International Journal of 
Financial Studies. The focus of articles in this Special Issue is mostly on family enterprises’ behavior 
and performance. In addition, one article provides a review of the definition of family firms in the 
literature. This Guest Editor’s note synthesizes the contributing authors’ propositions and findings 
regarding family firms in different parts of the world and suggests future research directions. 
Indeed, a large number of firms around the world exhibit family involvement in various ways  
(e.g., family ownership), which can significantly impact their strategies, behavior, and performance. 
When family business members have intentions to pursue particularistic goals and strategies, they are 
more likely to be influential on firm strategies, behavior, and performance. Such intentions can lead to 
strategic behaviors that are often oriented toward preserving the economic and socioemotional wealth 
of the firm for the family in the long run. Consequently, family firm behavior is expected to be distinct 
from those in non-family firms and among family firms. Since family firms are key value creators 
around the globe (Bertrand and Schoar [1]), we invited researchers to shed light on how families use 
their influence to affect the behavior and performance of firms. Taking a closer look at the effects of 
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family involvement on these companies across the world helps us also appreciate the research progress 
made to date and identify the areas deserving future research. This Guest Editor’s note provides such a 
discussion, distilling key findings and how they could enrich future theory building and testing. 
This Special Issue on Family Firms and the Guest Editor’s Note can guide future research in several 
ways. First, the importance of family governance to explain how families control corporations 
differently is highlighted. By doing so, this Special Issue draws attention to the differences between 
publicly traded family and non-family firms that are likely to have an impact on firm behavior 
performance. Second, this Special Issue helps us better understand how family involvement in the 
business can influence firm behavior and performance. This improves our understanding of the 
heterogeneity among family firms. Third, new insights and future research directions regarding 
behavior and performance differences between family and non-family firms as well as among family 
firms themselves are provided. 
The remainder of the Guest Editor’s Note will progress as follows: First, this Editor’s Note will 
summarize each article in the Special Issue. Then, key propositions and findings and their theoretical 
and practical implications are evaluated. This allows identification of several under-researched areas 
that require close scholarly attention. In the final section of the Guest Editor’s note, promising future 
research directions and insights for practitioners are discussed. 
2. Articles 
2.1. Definition of Family Business 
Since the findings on behavior and performance in previous studies might be affected by the family 
firm definition, the review of Harms [2] is particularly important in this Special Issue. Harms [2] 
identifies six different clusters by focusing on the most frequently used definitions in previous research. 
Components of Involvement and Essence Approaches have been grouped together since this 
categorization by Chua, Chrisman and Sharma [3] suggests that components factors, such as ownership 
or control, have to be combined with elements depicting the essence of family businesses, such as 
visions and intentions. Studies based on Chua et al. [3] and more recent updates (e.g., Chrisman et al. [4]) 
systematically differentiate between family and non-family firms as well as among family businesses 
themselves, suggesting that components and essence factors are jointly crucial to account for family 
firms’ uniqueness. 
Definitions with Empirical Focus are explicitly geared toward conducting empirical analyses. First 
introduced by Anderson and Reeb [5] and extended by Villalonga and Amit [6], this definitional 
approach specifies operational criteria to empirically measure family business characteristics, 
especially those with effects on the relationship between family ownership and firm performance. 
Definitions applied before the publication of the aforementioned definitional concepts as well as  
those intended to account to specific research designs are summarized under Other Definitions.  
Self-Developed Definitions categorize studies in which the authors neglected previous definitions and 
based their studies on new sub-classification and self-developed approaches. In contrast to those 
assigned to the other clusters, studies Without Explicit Definition did not refer to any family firm 
definition or solely pointed to the used data source without defining the object of investigation. 
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Furthermore, Harms [2] assigned some studies to the cluster F-PEC or “Familiness” (i.e., family 
influence by power, experience, and culture) (Astrachan et al. [7]), which contains all studies targeted 
at discussing “soft factors”, such as family’s values or commitment to the business. These definitions 
partly build on the components of involvement or essence approach, but highlight the importance of 
experience and culture to explain family firms’ distinctiveness. 
2.2. Financial Performance in Family versus Non-Family Publicly Traded Firms 
A prominent stream of research shows that family firms may outperform non-family firms around 
the world (e.g., Anderson and Reeb [5]; Andres [8]). While investigating the performance differences 
between not only family and non-family firms, but also among family firms, studies also draw 
attention to different family involvement configurations (e.g., founding family control vs. descendant 
family control, family vs. non-family CEO, the degree of board independence, and family firm types), 
which may lead to performance differences not only between family and non-family firms, but also 
among family firms as well (Anderson and Reeb [5,9]; Villalonga and Amit [6]). Research to date shows 
that these different configurations of family ownership and management can be associated with firm 
value positively or negatively or exhibit no relationship (O’Boyle et al. [10]; Peng and Jiang [11]). 
Hence, findings are mixed concerning the performance differences between founder-controlled and 
descendant-controlled family firms. 
On the one hand, research shows that founder-controlled firms can outperform not only non-family 
firms, but also descendant-controlled family firms (Andres [8]; Miller and Le Breton-Miller [12]; 
Villalonga and Amit [6]). According to Miller and Le Breton-Miller [12], the success factors in  
founder-controlled firms are family owners’ voting rights deriving from significant equity rights,  
a strong CEO without complete voting control and accountable to independent directors, multiple  
family members serving as managers, and transgenerational succession intentions. Morck et al. [13] 
show that heir-controlled Canadian firms exhibit low financial performance, which can be a factor that 
impedes economic growth. This may stem from the entrenchment of unqualified family managers 
(Morck et al. [13]). The descendants may also pursue the private benefits of control when they are 
wealthy enough to do so through inherited wealth. Another reason may be that the positive effects of 
family influence tend to be weaker in later generations when family influence is more dispersed or 
fractionalized (Gomez-Mejia et al. [14]). 
Some scholars, however, argue the opposite by showing that descendant-controlled firms are more 
efficient and profitable than founder-controlled firms even though founder-controlled firms tend to 
grow faster and invest more in capital assets and research and development (McConaughy et al. [15]; 
McConaughy et al. [16]). Similarly, Morck et al. [13] show that firm performance becomes lower 
when the firm is run by a member of the founding family than when it is run by an officer unrelated to 
the founder in older firms. According to Sraer and Thesmar [17], family firms largely outperform  
non-family firms regardless of being controlled by the founding or descendant families in control in 
France. However, Miller et al. [18] show that only businesses with a lone founder, rather than a 
founding family, outperform others among Fortune 1000 firms. Miller and Le Breton-Miller [12] 
observe that family-controlled businesses perform well when they mitigate agency costs and foster 
stewardship behaviors among leaders. 
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In this Special Issue, five articles take a closer look at the impact of family involvement on firm 
performance within different contexts in different countries (i.e., US, Poland, Mexico, and China),  
giving us the comparison opportunity across different parts of the world. 
First, Noguera and Chang [19] examine Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) founders versus 
successors through the lens of the socioemotional wealth (SEW) perspective. The authors show that 
founders preserve SEW by appointing a descendant as the REIT CEO and using the family name to 
identify the REIT. On the one side, REITs led by successors underperform other REITS (led by 
professional managers after succeeding the REIT founder or REITs led by their founders) and 
independent board members are not positively influential in REITs’ governance. On the other side,  
the family identification through the use of family name in REIT influences performance positively. 
The paper by Lipiec [20] examines how publicly-traded family firms perform during economic 
downturns compared to non-family firms in the construction sector in Poland. The author shows that 
publicly-traded family firms significantly outperform non-family peers during economic crisis and 
presents future research directions in regards to the determinants of performance in these 
outperforming family firms. 
The article by San Martin-Reyna and Duran-Encalada [21] shows a positive link between family 
ownership concentration and performance among publicly-traded firms in Mexico. In addition, lower 
levels of debt and less participation by independent directors in family businesses strengthens this 
positive link. Nevertheless, in non-family firms, higher levels of participation by independent directors 
and debt contribute to better performance. 
Relevant to San Martin-Reyna and Duran-Encalada’s [21] work, the article by Luo and Liu [22] in 
this Special Issue, examines publicly-traded family firms in China. The authors show that there is an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between family ownership concentration and corporate value, and 
board independence positively moderates this relationship, suggesting interest-alignment effects of 
family ownership concentration up to an optimum level. After an optimum level, entrenchment  
effects prevail. 
Consistent with Luo and Liu’s [22] work, Memili and Misra [23] examine the S&P 500 firms and 
show the moderation effects of corporate governance provisions on the inverted U-shaped links 
between family involvement (i.e., family ownership and family management) in publicly-traded firms 
and firm performance by drawing upon agency theory, with a focus on principal-principal agency 
issues, and the extant family governance literature. Hence, both family involvement and the use of 
governance provisions are influential on firm performance in publicly-traded firms in the US. 
2.3. Family Firm Behavior 
Aside from the performance outcomes of family involvement, the Special Issue presents two articles 
on Family Firm Behavior in the forms of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Succession. 
2.3.1. CSR in Family Firms 
CSR studies focusing on family firms suggest that family business owners’ greater commitment to 
the family firm, direct contact with customers, proactiveness in nurturing relationships with all 
stakeholders, long-term orientation, involvement in the community, and reputation concerns can 
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facilitate CSR activities (Bingham et al. [24]; Deniz and Suárez [25]; Dyer and Whetten [26];  
Uhlaner et al. [27]). 
In this Special Issue, Hirigoyen and Poulain-Rehm [28] demonstrate that publicly-traded family 
businesses in Europe, Asia, and North America do not differ from non-family firms in CSR activities 
in the forms of human resources (i.e., industrial relations, employment relations, and working 
conditions), human rights (i.e., freedom of association, promotion of collective bargaining,  
non-discrimination, equality, elimination of child or any forced labor as well as harassment, and 
protection of personal data), community involvement, protection of environment, and business 
relations (i.e., rights and interests of customers, integration of social and environmental standards in 
the selection of suppliers, and respect for competition rules). The authors also show a negative 
relationship between family governance and corporate governance practices in terms of the balance of 
power and effectiveness of board, audit and control mechanisms, engagement with shareholders, and 
executive compensations. 
2.3.2. Succession in Family Firms 
Intra-family succession is critical for family firms’ longevity. Boyd and colleagues [29] develop a 
conceptual model of incumbent decisions on succession in family firms by drawing upon the theory of 
planned behavior and socioemotional wealth (SEW). The authors suggest that family, firm, industry,  
and cultural contexts can shape concerns about family and business, in turn affecting attitudes toward 
the type of succession, norms, and perceived behavioral control. These can consequently determine the 
intention toward a particular type of succession. 
3. Discussion and Conclusions 
There has been a prominent stream of research investigating whether family firms outperform  
non-family firms. The general conclusion has been that they do. However, performance differences  
also depend upon the type of family involvement (e.g., founder control) (e.g., Anderson and Reeb [5]; 
Miller et al. [18]; Villalonga and Amit [6]). There has been also an increase in research examining  
family firm performance and its antecedents, owing to the critical role of firm value in buy-out 
decisions, tax payments, executive compensation, capital raising strategies, and selling the company 
(Villalonga [30]). The articles in this Special Issue (e.g., Lipiec [20]; San Martin-Reyna and  
Duran-Encalada [21]) are in line with studies showing that family ownership and management can 
enhance firm value since the controlling family can provide superior oversight through lengthy tenure, 
investment in long-term projects, or exhibit reputation concerns that diminish the possibility of 
questionable or irresponsible business practices (Anderson and Reeb [5]; Dyer and Whetten [26]). 
Nevertheless, family involvement can also result in negative firm behavior and performance, if 
principal-principal agency problems prevail, particularly after an optimum level of family ownership 
and/or management (e.g., Luo and Liu [22]; Memili and Misra [23]). 
Existing research generally explores the use of various governance mechanisms and performance 
differences between family firms and non-family firms and among family firms by drawing upon agency 
theory with a focus on principal-principal agency issues (e.g., Memili [31]; Memili and Misra [23]). 
However, institutional factors tend to play a role in governance systems as well. Accordingly, a recent 
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review by Gedajlovic et al. [32] suggests that the effects of family firm governance may depend on the 
existence of institutional factors. Indeed, family owners and managers may have more or less power 
than their peers in different countries (Memili [31]). For example, in the US, family owners and 
managers may not have as high levels of discretion power as peers in some other countries owing to 
effective investor protection. Accordingly, Peng and Jiang [11] suggest that the impact of family 
ownership and control on firm value is associated with the level of shareholder protection ensured by 
legal and regulatory institutions of a country. On the one hand, when there is effective investor 
protection, family owners tend to dilute their equity to attract minority shareholders and delegate 
management to professional managers (Peng and Jiang [11]). In this case, family owners and managers 
do not have the need or motivation to use control enhancing governance mechanisms to enhance their 
power. On the other hand, when the legal system is weak, ownership becomes more concentrated by 
family owners who would seek to ensure their control by participating in management (Peng and  
Jiang [11]). However, the negative aspect of the enhanced power of the controlling family in an 
environment characterized by weak legal investor protection is the likelihood of principal-principal 
agency problems such as expropriation of non-controlling shareholder wealth and entrenchment of the 
controlling family. Therefore, future research would benefit from exploring the relative effects of 
institutionalization versus family influence on firm performance through the lens of institutional theory 
within the context of different countries’ legal regimes. 
The meta-analytic approaches for examining the link between family involvement in corporations 
and firm performance will be particularly helpful to reconcile the inconsistencies in prior findings 
through a quantitative integration of the results of previous studies. This can allow for calculating an 
overall effect through consolidating available empirical evidence into a single quantitative effect size, 
and testing the role of various contingency factors, such as sample differences, study design 
differences, measures, regions, and more. The meta-analytic review (e.g., O’Boyle et al. [10];  
Wagner et al. [33]) can thereby help integrate available empirical evidence, while at the same time 
identifying under-researched areas. More specifically, this type of review can highlight the importance 
of different forms of family involvement in publicly-traded firms to explain how families control 
corporations differently. By doing so, it can contribute to a better understanding of the differences 
between publicly-traded family and non-family firms that are likely to have an impact on firm 
performance. Second, it can add to the literature by reviewing different publicly-traded family firm 
governance contexts and contingencies that can influence firm performance. By this, our understanding 
of the heterogeneity among family firms (Melin and Norqvist [34]) will be improved. Third, new 
insights and future research directions regarding corporate governance differences between family and 
non-family firms as well as among family firms can be provided. 
This Guest Editor’s Note summarizes the articles in the Special Issue, explains the relevance as  
well as differences among the articles, and draws attention to different contexts (e.g., the extent of 
institutionalization and the legal environment) that may play a role in family firm behavior and 
performance. If publicly traded family firms can capitalize on the positive effects of family 
involvement and mitigate agency problems, they can achieve superior performance. Publicly traded 
family firms concerned with maximizing shareholder value and attaining competitive advantages 
through family control will be sought after by investors and reap the benefits of positive corporate image. 
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